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COHABITATION IN ILLINOIS: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE
INTERVENTION
STEFANIE L. FERRARI*
INTRODUCTION
Nearly forty years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt1
ruled against a woman who sought property from her partner of fifteen 
years with whom she shared three children, but whom she never married. 
In doing so, the court determined that it would not recognize equitable or 
contractual rights based on marriage-type relationships between unmarried 
cohabitants.2 Recently, in Blumenthal v. Brewer,3 the Illinois Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to once again weigh in on the issue. However, 
despite the Court’s acknowledgement that societal norms and values to-
wards unmarried couples living together have changed significantly in the 
past forty years, it nevertheless upheld Hewitt and denied a woman’s equi-
table claims from her partner of twenty-five years with whom she shared 
three children, but could not marry.4
The Hewitt case was an outlier to begin with—it came in a decade 
when cohabitation had catapulted into the limelight5 and most states began 
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018; B.S., University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2014. 
Thank you to Professor Katharine Baker and Kyle Jacobs, as well as the entire Chicago-Kent Law 
Review, for your assistance throughout the various stages of this Note. I would also like to thank all of 
the family and friends who loved and supported me in spite of the reclusion this process required; this 
Note, and my success during law school, would not have been possible without you all.
1. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
2. Id. (holding that Mrs. Hewitt could not recover an equal share of profits and properties accu-
mulated by her and her partner of fifteen years because such a claim contravened public policy disfa-
voring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants). 
3. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 81, 69 N.E.3d 834, 858.
4. Id. (barring plaintiff’s claim for restitution as it contravenes the public policy implicit in the 
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act). Notably, a significant aspect of this case was that it involved a 
same-sex couple who did not have the option to marry in Illinois. A discussion of equal protection and 
due process claims can be found in the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Illinois and Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. However, given the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges legalizing same-sex marriage, issues of constitutional 
rights of same-sex couples regarding marriage rights will not be addressed in this Note. 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015).
5. Around 1970, statutory restraints on cohabitation—such as false registration laws, which 
prevented unmarried couples from checking into a hotel—and customary restraints—such as landlords 
refusing to rent to unmarried couples—were removed, and by 1998, the number of unmarried cohabit-
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to recognize at least some property-sharing rights between cohabiting cou-
ples. Today, Illinois remains one of only three states that refuses to recog-
nize any contractual rights of cohabiting couples regarding property and 
support unless those contractual rights are entirely collateral to the relation-
ship.6 Now that Hewitt has been reaffirmed, the court’s decision, along 
with Illinois’s policy on cohabitating couples, has come under much criti-
cism in the popular press.7 Upon examination, it is clear that the Illinois 
Supreme Court is being motivated by a policy goal that is not actually be-
ing served.
Part I will serve as an overview of the basis for the Illinois policy on 
unmarried cohabitants, as stated in Hewitt. Part I will then look at post-
Hewitt cases to see how Illinois courts have interpreted Hewitt’s holding 
and reveal how courts actually treat contractual rights between unmarried 
cohabitants in Illinois. Finally, Part I will examine the holding in Blumen-
thal v. Brewer,8 to show how it has also failed to accomplish Hewitt’s un-
derlying policy goal. Moreover, Blumenthal’s holding has perpetuated the 
unjust results from Hewitt by unfairly withholding protections from non-
marital couples while not actually serving the purported public policy pur-
pose of favoring marriage. This Note argues that, given the Illinois 
ing couples increased eightfold, from 523,000 in 1970 to 4.2 million in 1998. THEODORE CAPLOW ET 
AL., THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900–2000, at 
72 (2001); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Broken Clock: The Illinois Supreme Court Affirms Mis-
guided, 37-Year-Old Ban on Economic Rights for Cohabiting Couples, JUSTIA (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/08/30/broken-clock-illinois-supreme-court-affirms-misguided-37-year-
old-ban-economic-rights-cohabiting-couples [https://perma.cc/4PNC-QRW6 ] (“Once a rare and secret-
ed practice, couples began to ‘shack up’ in large number in the 1970s due to changing sexual mores and 
the advancement of women’s rights. This was a stark change from the past in which cohabitation was 
not only the subject of social disapproval, but was also a criminal act in many states.”).
6. Georgia and Louisiana are the other two states that will not enforce contracts between unmar-
ried cohabitants. See Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to enforce 
express and implied contracts between unmarried cohabitants because the agreements rest on immoral 
and illegal consideration); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1983) 
(holding that, “[u]nder present Louisiana law, unmarried cohabitation does not give rise to property 
rights analogous to or similar to those of married couples”).
7. See Grossman, supra note 5; Robert McCoppin, Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Property 
Division for Unmarried Couples, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 20, 2016, 1:06 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-illinois-supreme-court-domestic-partners-
property-ruling-met-20160819-story.html [https://perma.cc/6C6Y-TE64]; Tom Joaquin, Still Locked 
Out: In Blumenthal v. Brewer, Illinois Supreme Court Refuses Property Division for an Unmarried 
Couple, WOODHULL FREEDOM FOUND. (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.woodhullfoundation.org/2016/sex-
and-the-law/still-locked-out-in-blumenthal-v-brewer-illinois-supreme-court-refuses-property-division-
for-an-unmarried-couple/ [https://perma.cc/3XZA-R5UA]; Jim Dey, State High Court Upholds 1979 
Ruling in Uncommon Case, NEWS-GAZETTE (Aug. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM) http://www.news-
gazette.com/news/local/2016-08-23/jim-dey-state-high-court-upholds-1979-ruling-uncommon-
case.html [https://perma.cc/7KSP-GKEX].
8. 2016 IL 118781, 69 N.E.3d 834.
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Supreme Court’s refusal to judicially construct a policy on the economic 
rights of cohabitants, the Illinois legislature should step in.
Part II reviews how other states treat marriage-type contractual rights 
between unmarried cohabitants and, in doing so, reveals the options availa-
ble for the Illinois legislature. As will be shown, there is a spectrum of 
contractual rights granted to unmarried cohabiting couples ranging from 
virtually none to granting unmarried cohabitants many of the same rights 
granted to married couples. Each approach offers different benefits and 
pitfalls for both cohabitants and courts.
In Part III, I suggest that the Illinois legislature should adopt a statuto-
ry scheme allowing unmarried cohabitants to enter into enforceable express 
agreements regarding their property and financial rights, even where such 
agreements are entered in contemplation of cohabitation. Additionally, I 
argue that the legislature should create statutory guidelines detailing when, 
and under what circumstances, unmarried cohabitants can bring claims 
seeking property or financial rights under the theory of implied contract. 
Such a statutory scheme will accomplish the underlying policy goal in 
Hewitt—limiting cases between unmarried cohabitants—and put an end to 
the current unjust practice in Illinois in which unmarried cohabitants are 
denied any legal protections.
I. ILLINOIS LAW ON COHABITATION AGREEMENTS
A. Hewitt v. Hewitt
In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court first spoke on the ability of two 
unmarried, cohabiting partners to establish contractual or equitable rights in 
the case of Hewitt v. Hewitt. After the plaintiff, Victoria Hewitt, became 
pregnant while the couple was attending college together, the defendant, 
Robert Hewitt, promised her that he would “share his life, his future, his 
earnings and his property” with her.9 From then on, the couple’s relation-
ship looked very much like a marriage.10 They lived together for fifteen 
years, conceived and raised three children, purchased property together and 
established a dental practice.11 Victoria gave Robert “every assistance a 
9. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979). 
10. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 
1979), and overruled by Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979) (finding that the couple lived “a
most conventional, respectable and ordinary family life”).
11. Robert was a successful dentist who had relied on Victoria’s support, including money she 
borrowed from her parents, while he went to school and set up his dental practice. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 
1205. 
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wife and mother could give, including social activities designed to enhance 
his social and professional reputation.”12
When the couple broke up,13 Victoria sought “an equal share of the 
profits and properties accumulated by the parties”14 under theories of im-
plied contract, constructive trust and unjust enrichment.15 The circuit court 
dismissed her complaint finding “that Illinois law and public policy require 
such claims to be based on a valid marriage.”16 The appellate court, adopt-
ing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Marvin v. Marvin,17 re-
versed the circuit court’s decision and found that plaintiff had a cause of 
action based on an express oral contract.18
On appeal, the supreme court unanimously reversed the appellate 
court’s holding.19 In doing so, the court expressly rejected Marvin and re-
lied heavily on the public policy judgments expressed by the legislature in 
enacting the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. However, 
upon examination, it becomes clear that the Court’s reasoning is flawed.
1. The Court’s Rejection of Marvin: Faulty Reasoning
One of the main reasons the Illinois Supreme Court refused to recog-
nize contractual or equitable rights arising from cohabitation was its rejec-
tion of the reasoning in Marvin. Specifically, the Illinois Supreme Court 
read Marvin as stating that, if the courts were to recognize that common 
law principles of express contract govern express agreements between un-
married cohabitants, then they must also recognize common law principles 
of implied contract, equitable relief and constructive trust in the absence of 
such an agreement.20
According to the Hewitt court, it would be unlikely that couples who 
lived together would enter into express agreements regulating their proper-
12. Id.
13. Victoria, thinking they were married, initially filed for divorce, which the circuit court dis-
missed since the parties had never been married. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1206.
17. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (allowing for the enforcement of express contracts, so long as it was 
not explicitly founded on the consideration of sexual services, as well as implied contracts and equitable 
remedies, when warranted by the facts of the case); see also Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1206 (finding that 
the appellate court “adopted the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in the widely publicized 
case of Marvin v. Marvin”).
18. The appellate court noted that the “single flaw” in the Hewitt’s relationship was the lack of a 
valid marriage, thus, Victoria should not be denied relief based on public policy grounds. Hewitt, 394 
N.E.2d at 1206.
19. Id. at 1211.
20. Id. at 1207.
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ty rights.21 That being the case, many of the cases brought would rely on 
implied contracts or equitable principles which would, in turn, “result in 
substantial amounts of litigation . . . [and] necessarily involve details of the 
parties’ living arrangements.”22 Thus, in an attempt to avoid this resulting 
extensive litigation, the court concluded that it could not recognize express 
agreements. In sum, the court’s argument looks something like this: If we 
allow A (express contracts between unmarried cohabitants), then we must 
allow B (implied contracts and equitable relief between unmarried cohabit-
ants); we do not want B, as it would result in large amounts of exhaustive 
litigation, so we cannot allow A.
This argument rests on a faulty premise (if A, then B). The Hewitt
court indicated that this premise was established in Marvin, but that is an 
exaggeration. The court in Marvin merely held that “in the absence of an 
express agreement, the court may look to a variety of other remedies in 
order to protect the parties’ lawful expectations.”23 Marvin did not say that 
when there was no express agreement the court must recognize another 
remedy. Furthermore, the Hewitt court failed to explain why, if Illinois
were to allow express contracts between unmarried cohabitants, it would 
also be forced to recognize implied contracts and equitable relief. After all, 
even if that is what Marvin held, courts in Illinois would be in no way 
bound by that holding. Finally, this premise is clearly not followed in other 
areas of law where courts require that a contract be in writing,24 so why 
must it be followed in this area? The Hewitt court offered no explanation as 
to why the recognition of express agreements between unmarried cohabit-
ants would automatically lead to the need for recognition of implied 
agreements and equitable rights.
The Hewitt court could have determined that only express agreements 
would be recognized, thereby avoiding the unwanted litigation it feared 
would result from implied and equitable claims while also giving unmar-
ried cohabitants greater certainty regarding their property and financial 
situations. Indeed, as discussed in Part II.C infra, many states, post-Marvin,
opted to only enforce express agreements between unmarried cohabitants.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122 (emphasis added).
24. See Illinois Frauds Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/1–80/18 (West 2017).
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2. Public Policy and the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act: False Incentives
The Hewitt court ultimately concluded that contracts between unmar-
ried cohabitants were unenforceable because they contravene public policy 
the court thought implicit in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act (“IMDMA”).25 The court found that the IMDMA’s purpose was 
clearly to “strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard 
family relationships.”26 The court was reluctant to allow judicial recogni-
tion of property rights between unmarried cohabitants for fear that it would 
“potentially enhanc[e] the attractiveness of a private arrangement over 
marriage.”27 Therefore, in an effort to protect marriage and reduce any 
incentive for couples to live together without marrying, the court concluded 
that allowing Victoria to claim contractual rights based on an express oral 
agreement would contravene the IMDMA and her claims were thus unen-
forceable.28 As a consequence of deciding not to marry, Victoria was un-
derstandably denied relief under the IMDMA. However, in the name of 
protecting marriage, she was also denied any equitable or contractual rights 
arising out of her relationship with Robert. Thus she was left with fewer 
rights than single people, who can easily enter into enforceable property-
sharing arrangements with others, including roommates or family mem-
bers.
The Hewitt court conceivably relied so heavily on legislative policy in 
a further attempt to avoid litigating claims involving contractual rights
between unmarried cohabitants. Rather than simply granting to unmarried 
cohabitants the same right to enter into an enforceable agreement regarding 
property and financial rights as those not in a sexual relationship, the court 
flatly rejected any equitable or contractual rights and left it to the legisla-
ture to update Illinois public policy. In its view, “[t]here are major public 
policy questions involved in determining whether, under what circumstanc-
es, and to what extent it is desirable to accord some type of legal status to 
claims arising from such relationships,” and the legislature is better suited 
to make such determinations.29 Therefore, the Hewitt court held that Illinois 
courts would not recognize any equitable or contractual rights between 
unmarried cohabitants, other than those about completely independent mat-
25. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
26. Id. at 1209 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, para. 102 (current version at 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/102)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1211.
29. Id. at 1207.
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ters, for which sexual relations do not form part of the consideration and do 
not closely resemble those arising from conventional marriages.30
B. Post-Hewitt: Is the Illinois Supreme Court’s Policy Goal Being 
Served?
The Hewitt court’s strict ban on all types of contractual and equitable 
rights has left unmarried cohabitants with very few legal options. While the
Hewitt court recognized “that cohabitation by the parties may not prevent 
them from forming valid contracts about independent matters, for which it 
is said the sexual relations do not form part of the consideration,”31 it de-
nied that contracts between cohabitants could be severable from that sexual 
relationship.32 In other words, the only contracts that can be enforced are 
those between cohabitants who are not having sex with each other.33 There-
fore, in an attempt to get around this strict ban on any contract in which sex 
forms part of the consideration, unmarried cohabitants seeking property or 
financial rights have had to resort to trying to prove that they entered into 
an agreement entirely independent of their romantic relationship. As can be 
seen in Illinois’s case law, these claims generally manifest themselves as 
equitable claims.
1. Claims Held Independent from Cohabitation
Two Illinois appellate court cases demonstrate instances where the 
court held that contractual rights between unmarried cohabitants were suf-
ficiently separate from the cohabiting relationship so as to render the en-
forcement of those rights appropriate: Spafford v. Coats34 and Kaiser v. 
Fleming.35
The plaintiff in Spafford, Donna Spafford, sought a constructive trust 
on several vehicles that the parties purchased during their cohabitation, 
several of which were financed by a loan which Donna obtained, and others 
30. Id. at 1208.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1209. 
33. The court noted that several sister states had recognized that housekeeping and homemaking 
services could constitute the consideration for an enforceable contract between cohabitants, severable 
from the illegal contract founded on sexual relations, or that agreements in which the consideration was 
cohabitation may still be valid. Id. at 1208. However, the court rejected this notion and found it would 
be “more candid to acknowledge the return of varying forms of common law marriage than to continue 
displaying the naivete . . . involved in the assertion that there are contracts separate and independent 
from the sexual activity, and the assumption that those contracts would have been entered into or would 
continue without that activity.” Id. at 1209.
34. 455 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
35. 735 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
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to which she contributed a substantial portion of the purchase price.36 In
addressing the trial court’s denial of equitable relief based on public policy 
as stated in Hewitt, the Spafford court examined the basis underlying that 
decision:
[T]he real and underlying concern of the supreme court in Hewitt was
that judicial recognition of mutual property rights between knowingly 
unmarried cohabitants—where the claim is based upon or intimately re-
lated to the cohabitation of the parties—would in effect grant to unmar-
ried cohabitants substantially the same marital rights enjoyed by married 
persons, resurrect the doctrine of common law marriage, and contravene 
the public policy enunciated by the Illinois legislature to strengthen and 
preserve the integrity of marriage.37
The court went on to distinguish the situation before it from the situation in 
Hewitt and stated that Donna Spafford’s claims were based on evidence 
that she substantially contributed to the consideration for the purchase of 
several vehicles, whereas Victoria Hewitt had based her claims primarily 
upon the rendition of housekeeping and homemaking services.38 Thus, the 
court concluded that “where the claims do not arise from the relationship 
between the parties and are not rights closely resembling those arising from 
conventional marriages . . . the public policy expressed in Hewitt does not 
bar judicial recognition of such claims.”39
Similarly, in Kaiser the court found that the plaintiff Barbara Kaiser’s, 
claim in equity was “substantially independent” from her relationship with 
defendant and allowed her to recover money she had contributed toward 
her former cohabiting boyfriend’s mortgage.40 The parties had been living 
together in an unmarried relationship when the defendant suggested to Bar-
bara, who had previously received a lump sum payment from the dissolu-
tion of her prior marriage, that she use that money to help him pay off his 
mortgage.41 Barbara subsequently gave the defendant a check for 
$47,188.38, the amount remaining on his mortgage, which he used to pay 
off the mortgage.42 While living together, the parties shared expenses, but 
Barbara eventually moved out after the relationship became strained.43
36. Spafford, 455 N.E.2d at 242.
37. Id. at 245.
38. Id.
39. Id. 
40. Kaiser, 735 N.E.2d at 148.
41. Id. at 146.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Barbara tried to get the money she contributed to the mortgage back, 
but defendant refused, telling her that he would repay her the amount when 
the property sold and deduct her share of the utility bills that he paid while 
she lived in the property.44 The court distinguished Barbara’s case from a 
previous case, Ayala v. Fox, where the court held that the plaintiff did not 
have an equity interest in a property she lived in with the defendant even 
though she contributed to the mortgage, taxes, and insurance payments.45
In distinguishing Ayala, the Kaiser court concluded that unlike the plaintiff 
there, “plaintiff here alleged rights substantially independent from her 
nonmarital relationship with the defendant. . . . Further, the plaintiff in 
Ayala sought additional relief akin to a marital relationship and based her 
claims on the fact that she and the defendant ‘lived together as husband and 
wife.’”46
Both of these cases involved plaintiffs asserting equitable rights. As 
their decisions indicate, Illinois courts are hesitant to grant equitable rights 
to unmarried cohabitants, and will do so only where plaintiff has adequate 
evidence that the consideration for the agreement arose from something 
other than the relationship itself, and where the relief sought does not close-
ly reflect traditional marital rights. More importantly, these cases indicate 
how the goal expressed in Hewitt is being undermined under the current 
state of Illinois law. The Hewitt court wanted to avoid cases that rely on 
equitable principles, but as the above cases exemplify, unmarried cohabit-
ants are bringing cases based on equitable principles. All litigants have to 
do is be careful not to allege that they were in a “marriage-type” relation-
ship, or that sex was in any way contemplated as part of the agreement. 
Litigants who successfully do so are able to have their equitable claims 
heard by the court, which in turn requires the court involving itself in the 
details of the parties’ living arrangement. Thus, the very situation Hewitt 
sought to avoid—substantial litigation involving details of the parties’ liv-
ing arrangement—has manifested itself with the help of a little shrewd 
lawyering.
2. Claims Held Dependent on Cohabitation
Some Illinois courts have continued to deny relief to unmarried cohab-
itants who bring claims based on a “marriage-like” or “quasi-marital” rela-
tionship. In Costa v. Oliven,47 Eugene Costa sued Catherine Oliven, with 
44. Id.
45. Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
46. Kaiser, 735 N.E.2d at 148 (quoting Ayala, 564 N.E.2d at 921)).
47. 849 N.E.2d 122, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
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whom he had lived with for twenty-four years in an unmarried, “quasi-
marital” relationship, for imposition of a constructive trust, an accounting, 
and payment of unpaid wages and financial compensation.48 After twelve 
years of cohabitation, a child was born to the parties on May 5, 1992, at 
which time Costa assumed the role of a stay-at-home dad.49 According to 
his complaint, Oliven “wielded much influence and superior bargaining 
power over [plaintiff] . . . and successfully obtained title to almost every 
possession the couple acquired through joint labor and efforts.”50 Neverthe-
less, the court, relying on Hewitt, denied Costa relief based on constructive 
trust and accounting holding that public policy precluded unmarried cohab-
itants from having an equitable interest in the other’s property.51
Despite the holdings in Spafford and Kaiser, claimants who do not re-
ly solely on the basis of a marriage-like relationship, but rather on some 
economic contribution, may still be denied relief. The Second District in 
Ayala v. Fox,52 extended Hewitt’s limitations from property claims based 
on the providing of domestic services to claims based on financial contribu-
tions to the acquisition of shared property.53
Anita Ayala and Lawrence Fox cohabitated together for twelve years, 
beginning in 1976.54 At Fox’s suggestion, they agreed to jointly pay for the 
construction of a new home, and Fox promised Ayala that the title to the 
property would be transferred to them as joint tenants and that plaintiff 
would receive one-half of the equity of the house in the event their relation-
ship terminated.55 In reliance on the promise, they obtained a $48,000 loan 
to pay for the construction of the house.56 The house was completed in 
September 1978, and for ten years the parties cohabitated there and both 
contributed to the mortgage payments—however, during the first three 
years of cohabitation, Fox was unemployed and Ayala made the majority 
of the mortgage, tax and insurance payments.57 The parties split up in 
1988.58
48. Id. at 123 (alteration in original).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 125. 
52. 564 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 920.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Fox did not in fact transfer title to the couple as joint tenants, nor did 
he pay Ayala half of the equity in the property.59 Instead, he put the proper-
ty in a land trust.60 Ayala brought suit for a half interest in the realty and 
half of the personal property based on theories of promissory estoppel, 
unjust enrichment and fiduciary duty.61 The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint, finding that Hewitt barred claims based on property disputes be-
tween cohabitants.62 The appellate court affirmed, and in doing so, 
distinguished Spafford.
According to the court, the plaintiff in Spafford “did not seek recovery 
based on rights closely resembling those arising from a conventional mar-
riage or on rights founded on proof of cohabitation,” whereas Ayala, whose 
claim was “intimately related to her cohabitation with Fox,” was seeking 
recovery “based on rights closely resembling those arising from a conven-
tional marriage, namely, an equitable interest in the ‘marital’ residence.”63
As noted by one commentator, “[t]he court effectively shifted the inquiry 
from the basis for the claim (e.g., the nature of the consideration provided) 
to the nature of the claimed property,” so that a claimant seeking an inter-
est in a vehicle could do so—since joint ownership of vehicles is not inte-
gral to cohabitation—but a claimant seeking an interest in a residence could 
not because it “too closely resembles a spouse’s interest in the marital 
home.”64
This case is difficult to reconcile with Kaiser and Spafford, given their 
factual similarities. In all three cases, plaintiffs made financial contribu-
tions to acquiring property titled in the names of their male cohabitants. 
However, in Kaiser and Spafford, cohabitation did not preclude plaintiffs 
from recovering their interest in the property, but in Ayala it did. The dis-
tinction seems to be in the relief sought, and the grounds plaintiffs based 
their claims on. While the plaintiffs in Kaiser and Spafford merely sought 
constructive trusts over the amount contributed to shared property, the 
plaintiff in Ayala sought fifty percent of the equity in the home and half of 
the personal property accumulated during the marriage, which according to 
the courts, resembled marital rights too closely.65 Furthermore, the plain-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 921.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 922.
64. Jan Skelton, Hewitt to Ayala: A Wrong Turn for Cohabitants’ Rights, 82 ILL. B.J. 364, 368
(1994).
65. See Ayala, 564 N.E.2d at 922; Kaiser v. Fleming, 735 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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tiffs in Spafford and Kaiser did not base their claims on the fact they had 
“lived together as husband and wife,” as the plaintiff in Ayala did.
Thus, as indicated by Illinois case law, Illinois courts will only enforce 
equitable rights where the relief sought does not closely resemble rights 
arising out of conventional marriages, and where the claim is not reliant on 
the relationship itself as part of the consideration, but rather some form of 
financial contribution. For whatever reason—perhaps because couples (or 
their lawyers) know that contracts between unmarried couples will not be 
enforced in Illinois and thus they do not enter into them, or perhaps be-
cause those couples who do enter into contracts assume they will be en-
forced and thus do not challenge them in court—Illinois appellate courts 
have not addressed claims between unmarried cohabitants based on express 
contracts. As a result, it remains unclear what exactly a contract between 
unmarried cohabitants would have to look like in order to be enforceable.
3. Policy Goal in Hewitt Is Not Being Served
As these cases have shown, Hewitt’s policy goal of avoiding litigation 
between unmarried cohabitants is not being served. By banning every-
thing—express contracts, implied contracts and equitable relief—the 
Hewitt court has actually allowed for litigation between unmarried cohabit-
ants. Moreover, the reasons given by the Hewitt court for rejecting agree-
ments between unmarried cohabitants66 have not proven realistic. First, the 
court’s attempt at limiting litigation by refusing to recognize express 
agreements is clearly not working. Recall that the Hewitt court stated, if 
courts were to recognize express contracts, then they would also have to 
recognize implied contracts and equitable remedies; and, since most cou-
ples would not enter into express agreements, the result would be a flood of 
cases based on implied or equitable claims that would necessarily involve 
details of the couple’s living arrangement.67 But as the case law indicates, 
the very situation the Hewitt court sought to avoid is happening.
Unmarried cohabitants, being unable to enter into express agreements 
with their partners, must bring equitable claims to assert their property 
rights which necessarily involve details of the couple’s relationship. Rather 
than couples being able to enter into an agreement regulating their property 
and financial rights, and thus avoiding the need for courts to determine 
such rights, unmarried cohabitants seeking property rights are forced to 
seek equitable remedies (but none that are too close to marital rights) which
66. See supra Parts I.A.1 and I.A.2.
67. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979).
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involves the court delving into the couple’s relationship and the circum-
stances surrounding their agreement to determine whether the consideration 
was separate enough from their cohabitation so as to not defy the public 
policy expressed in Hewitt. The Hewitt court’s goal of avoiding this litiga-
tion would have been better served simply by allowing express agreements, 
so that unmarried cohabitants could have greater certainty regarding their 
property and financial rights and would know that failing to have such an 
agreement would likely defeat any claim.
The Hewitt court’s second basis for rejecting agreements between un-
married cohabitants is equally unrealistic. As discussed in Part I.A.2 above, 
the court placed much emphasis on the legislature’s supposed public policy 
favoring marriage, feared discouraging marriage by judicially recognizing 
property rights between unmarried cohabitants, and refused to recognize 
any equitable or contractual rights between unmarried cohabitants. Howev-
er, there is nothing to indicate that Illinois’s refusal to enforce cohabitation 
agreements has incentivized more couples to marry, or disincentivized 
couples from living together unmarried.68 In fact, in recent years, Illinois’s
percentage of unmarried couples living together has continued to increase, 
while that of married couples living together has decreased.69 If anything, 
in its attempt to make marriage more desirable, by withholding from un-
married cohabitants the rights associated with marriage, the Hewitt court
created a one-sided incentive.70 Partners who are more likely to perform 
non-economic work within the family, generally women, would have the 
incentive that the Hewitt court imagined—marry their partners in order to 
gain the protections of equitable distribution and maintenance. However, 
the other partner might have the opposite incentive—avoid marriage, but 
reap its benefits, in order to secure sole ownership of wages and property 
68. Grossman, supra note 5 (“[F]amily law incentives are hard to predict because people seldom 
know or understand the legal backdrop against which they form families; and even when they do know, 
they act from the heart rather than the head.”).
69. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: 2011–2015 American Community Survey 
5-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP02
&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/6R9P-H2MA]; Selected Social Characteristics In the United States: 
2006–2010 American Community Survey 5–Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP02
&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/6R9P-H2MA].
70. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Cohabitation and the Restatement (Third) of Restitu-
tion and Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1424 (2011) (pointing out that denying 
remedies because there has been unmarried cohabitation punishes only one of the two cohabitants and 
enriches the other). “Such an unequal outcome itself might weaken rather than strengthen the institution 
of marriage because it creates an incentive for the more financially savvy partner to opt out of mar-
riage.” Id.
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accumulated during the relationship.71 Thus, at best, the Hewitt court’s 
attempt to “preserve the integrity of marriage” incentivizes just the non-
economic working partner to marry; at worst, it disproportionately ad-
vantages the breadwinner.72
C. Blumenthal v. Brewer
Given the track record of cases following Hewitt, one would have ex-
pected the Illinois Supreme Court to reevaluate its position on cohabitation 
agreements when given the chance decades later. But rather than learning 
from Hewitt’s shortcomings, and recognizing the vast legal and social 
changes that have taken place since, the Illinois Supreme Court simply 
reiterated Hewitt’s main, albeit flawed, holding in Blumenthal v. Brewer73:
Illinois courts will not enforce equitable or contractual (express or implied) 
rights between cohabiting couples based on their marriage-like relationship 
because Illinois public policy, expressed by the legislature, favors mar-
riage.74 As in Hewitt, the Illinois Supreme Court seems to have been moti-
vated by its desire to avoid litigating these claims and has once again used 
the fear of discouraging marriage to justify leaving it up to the legislature.
1. Background
Dr. Jane E. Blumenthal and Judge Eileen M. Brewer maintained a 
twenty-six-year domestic partnership and raised three children together, but 
never married.75 Following the birth of their children, Brewer stayed home 
as their children’s primary caregiver and spent the greater amount of time 
in domestic tasks, which allowed Blumenthal to focus on her medical ca-
reer and become the family’s primary breadwinner.76 “As a consequence of 
the allocation of their respective responsibilities in the family following the 
birth of their children, Blumenthal came to earn two to three times as much 
71. The Illinois Appellate Court in Blumenthal also addressed these potential unintended conse-
quences of the Hewitt ruling. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 32, 24 N.E.3d 168, 
179, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 2016 IL 118781, 69 N.E.3d 834 (“The ruling, however, may have 
the contrary effect—refusing to hear claims between unmarried cohabitants creates an incentive for 
some to not marry. A cohabitant who by happenstance or design takes possession or title to jointly-
acquired assets is able to retain them without consequence when their ‘financially vulnerable’ counter-
part is turned away by the courts.” (quoting Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 70)). It also argued that the 
decision of Hewitt may have had the contrary policy effect of actually discouraging marriage because, 
by refusing to hear claims between unmarried cohabitants, the courts create an incentive for some to not 
marry.
72. See Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
73. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, 69 N.E.3d 834.
74. Id. ¶ 87, 69 N.E.3d at 860.
75. Id. ¶ 2, 69 N.E.3d at 839; Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 1, 24 N.E.3d at 169.
76. Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶¶ 5-6, 24 N.E.3d at 170.
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annually as Brewer.”77 However, during their entire relationship, the couple 
commingled their assets, including savings and investments.78 Using funds 
from their joint account, between 2000 and 2008, Blumenthal purchased an 
ownership interest in her medical practice group.79 Brewer contended that 
she allowed Blumenthal to make this investment using their joint account 
“with the reasonable understanding and expectation that she, Brewer, 
would continue to benefit from the earnings derived from [the medical 
group].”80
Blumenthal and Brewer ended their relationship in 2008, at which 
time Brewer ceased benefitting from the earnings of the medical practice as 
Blumenthal retained the entire interest in the medical group.81 After the 
relationship ended, Blumenthal sought partition of the family home she 
shared and jointly owned with Brewer.82 Brewer counterclaimed for vari-
ous common-law remedies, including sole title to the home as well as an 
interest in Blumenthal’s ownership share in the medical group “so that the 
couples overall assets would be equalized.”83 Brewer claimed that Blumen-
thal was unjustly enriched and requested that the court create a constructive 
trust from Blumenthal’s share of the annual earnings of the group or any 
proceeds from the sale of Blumenthal’s interest in the group that was at-
tributable to Brewer’s earnings or inheritance during their relationship.84
At the trial level, Blumenthal argued that Illinois public policy, as 
stated in Hewitt, did not allow for implied contract claims based on non-
marital cohabitation.85 The circuit court dismissed all counts of Brewer’s 
77. Id. ¶ 6, 24 N.E.3d at 170.
78. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 46, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
79. Id.
80. Id. Furthermore, “‘[i]t was [the couple’s] understanding that Brewer would not suffer any 
financial disadvantage from the way in which [they] allocated their parenting and career responsibili-
ties’ and ‘it was [always] their practice to share equally the same home, food, automobiles, vacations, 
vacation property, and to the extent they could, savings and investments.’” Blumenthal, 2014 IL App 
(1st) 132250, ¶ 6, 24 N.E.3d at 171 (alteration in original).
81. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 46, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
82. Id. ¶ 2, 69 N.E.3d at 839.
83. Id. ¶ 3, 69 N.E.3d at 839. Counts I, II, IV, and V of Brewer’s counterclaim all concerned the 
partition of the parties’ Chicago home and were dismissed after the circuit court’s judgment setting the 
value of the home and allocating the home’s equity between the parties. Id. ¶¶ 21–43, 69 N.E.3d at 
842–48. Count III concerned Brewer’s request that the court impose a constructive trust on Blumen-
thal’s medical group to remedy unjust enrichment or, in the alternative, for restitution. Id. ¶ 45, 69 
N.E.3d at 848. Count III was the only appealable claim, and therefore, the only claim considered by the 
Illinois Supreme Court under the Hewitt analysis. See id. ¶¶ 45–91, 69 N.E.3d at 848–60.
84. Id. ¶ 46, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
85. Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 15, 24 N.E.3d at 173.
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counterclaim, finding them barred as a matter of law by the Illinois Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Hewitt.86
The Illinois Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of Brewer’s coun-
terclaim by the circuit court and remanded for consideration of the parties’ 
remaining arguments, mainly, whether Brewer’s counterclaims satisfied the 
necessary elements of an implied contract.87 On appeal Brewer argued that 
the legislative policies underlying the Hewitt decision either no longer ex-
isted or had been substantially modified, and thus the trial court’s reliance 
on the Hewitt opinion was misplaced.88 She contended that at the time
Hewitt was decided, “it was public policy to treat unmarried relationships 
as illicit,” but in the decades since Hewitt was decided, the Illinois legisla-
ture had made profound legislative changes that, in effect, implicitly over-
ruled Hewitt’s categorical restriction on claims by unmarried partners.89
Blumenthal responded that Hewitt “was not based on a legislative policy to 
stigmatize or penalize cohabitants for their relationship, but was instead 
based on a statute that abolished common law marriage.” Furthermore, 
Blumenthal argued that Hewitt remains good law “because it gives effect to 
Illinois’ ongoing public policy that individuals acting privately by them-
selves cannot create a marriage relationship and that the government must 
be involved in the creation of that bond.”90
The appellate court found merit in both parties’ arguments, but ulti-
mately agreed with Brewer’s claims, finding that “the public policy to treat 
unmarried partnerships as illicit no longer exist[ed], that Brewer’s suit 
[was] not an attempt to retroactively create a marriage, and that allowing 
her to proceed with her claims . . . [did] not conflict with [Illinois’s] abol-
ishment of common law marriage.”91 In support of its decision, the appel-
late court adopted Brewer’s list of post-Hewitt legislative policy changes92
as evidence that “public policy has shifted dramatically in the ensuing 35 
years and that ongoing application of Hewitt is no longer justified.”93
86. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 10, 69 N.E.3d at 841.
87. Blumenthal, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 40, 24 N.E.3d at 183.
88. Id. ¶ 16, 24 N.E.3d at 173.
89. Id. ¶ 16, 24 N.E.3d at 173–74. The legislative policies Brewer relied upon include the repeal 
of the criminal prohibition on nonmarital cohabitation, the prohibition of differential treatment of 
marital and nonmarital children, the adoption of no-fault divorce, the establishment of civil unions for 
both opposite-sex and same-sex partners, and the extension of other significant protections to nonmari-
tal families. Id. ¶ 16, 24 N.E.3d at 173.
90. Id. ¶ 17, 24 N.E.3d at 174.
91. Id. ¶ 18, 24 N.E.3d at 174.
92. Id. ¶¶ 22–28, 33–35, 24 N.E.3d at 176–77, 180–81; see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. Id. ¶ 22, 24 N.E.3d at 176.
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Accordingly, the appellate court found Hewitt’s holding was mis-
placed.94 Moreover, rather than an attempt to retroactively redefine the 
couple’s relationship to receive the benefits of a legal marriage, as argued 
by Blumenthal, the court viewed Brewer’s counterclaim as a claim to have 
the same common-law property rights as others who are not in a cohabit-
ing, unmarried relationship.95 Thus, Brewer’s counterclaim was remanded 
to the circuit court.
2. The Illinois Supreme Court Weighs in Again
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Brewer’s invitation to 
overrule Hewitt and held that it remained good law.96 After resolving 
counts I, II, IV and V of Brewer’s counterclaim on other grounds,97 the 
court turned to its discussion of Hewitt with respect to count III which 
sought a constructive trust on Blumenthal’s medical practice to prevent 
unjust enrichment, or in the alternative, restitution.98 The court found these 
equitable remedies inappropriate since, “[w]hen considering the property 
rights of unmarried cohabitants, [the court’s] view of Hewitt’s holding 
ha[d] not changed.”99 Thus, such equitable claims could not be recognized. 
The court concluded, “[o]ur decision in Hewitt bars such relief if the claim 
is not independent from the parties’ living in a marriage-like relationship 
for the reason it contravenes the public policy, implicit in the statutory 
scheme of the Marriage and Dissolution Act, disfavoring the grant of mu-
tually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”100
The court reiterated the holding in Hewitt without addressing its prob-
lems. First, the court stated that “unmarried individuals may make express 
or implied contracts with one another, and such contracts will be enforcea-
ble if they are not based on a relationship indistinguishable from mar-
riage.”101 But the court offered little assistance to litigants trying to 
determine whether their agreement is adequately independent of their rela-
tionship so as to allow equitable or contractual rights. In an apparent at-
94. Id. ¶¶ 36–38, 24 N.E.3d at 182.
95. Id.
96. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 64, 69 N.E.3d at 853.
97. The Illinois Supreme Court found the appellate court’s judgment with respect to counts I, II, 
IV, and V (common-law claims related to the partition of the couple’s home) to be “fatally flawed” for 
two reasons unrelated to Hewitt: (1) the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from 
dismissal of those counts as it was not a final judgment, and (2) the appellate court had no authority to 
overrule the Hewitt decision and remained bound by it. Id. ¶¶ 21–29, 69 N.E.3d at 842–44.
98. Id. ¶ 45, 69 N.E.3d at 848.
99. Id. ¶ 63, 69 N.E.3d at 853.
100. Id. ¶ 73, 69 N.E.3d at 856.
101. Id. ¶ 87, 69 N.E.3d at 860.
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tempt to draw a line between independent and dependent claims, the court 
found that, where there is an indication that the unmarried cohabiting cou-
ple desired to live in a marriage-type relationship by “commingl[ing] their 
personal property and their finances,” or “pool[ing] their assets and financ-
es” to use in making purchases “to better their family situation,” any claim 
seeking mutually enforceable property rights would be barred.102 This 
fuzzy line may invite even more litigation by opening the door to unmar-
ried cohabitants who can argue that they did not pool their assets, or did not 
buy that car/make that investment/buy that house to better their family 
situation.
Second, the court stated that any change in Hewitt’s interpretation of 
Illinois public policy regarding unmarried cohabitants must be made by the 
legislature.103 The court underwent a detailed discussion rejecting Brewer’s 
arguments that various post-Hewitt legislative enactments indicate a public 
policy shift in regard to unmarried couples and their children.104 Contrary 
to Brewer’s assertion that such enactments indicate that the application of 
Hewitt is no longer justified, the court viewed these enactments—along 
with the fact that the statutory prohibition against common-law marriage 
has remained “completely untouched and unqualified”105—as an indication 
that the legislature had acquiesced to Hewitt’s holding.106 The court con-
cluded that it would “leave it to the legislative branch to determine whether 
and under what circumstances a change in the public policy governing the 
rights of parties in non-marital relationships is necessary.”107 Therefore, the 
court remained resolute that Illinois public policy favoring marriage is best 
served by withholding contractual and equitable rights from non-marital 
couples, regardless of what unfair consequences might result.
102. Id. ¶¶ 70–73, 69 N.E.3d at 855–56. For Brewer, this meant her claim to an interest in the 
medical group was barred since the court determined that the investment in the medical group was “an 
investment for the family . . . intimately related and dependent on Brewer’s marriage-like relationship
with Blumenthal.” Id. ¶ 71, 69 N.E.3d at 855.
103. See id. ¶¶ 74–81, 69 N.E.3d at 856–58.
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 76, 69 N.E.3d at 857.
106. Id. ¶ 77, 69 N.E.3d at 857. However, as pointed out by Justice Theis in her dissent, the legis-
lature’s silence on the rights of cohabitants does not necessarily indicate its rejection of claims brought 
by unmarried cohabitants asserting contractual or equitable rights. Id. ¶ 112, 69 N.E.3d at 866 (Theis, J., 
dissenting) (“Simply because the legislature has taken some action in the domestic relations arena does 
not mean that this court cannot act as well.”).
107. Id. ¶ 80, 69 N.E.3d at 858.
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D. Looks Like a Job for the Legislature
The Blumenthal court’s refusal to overrule Hewitt, coupled with its 
failure to draw a concrete line for determining what claims are adequately 
independent from the cohabitation to be considered enforceable, has left 
Illinois with a problem: the Illinois Supreme Court’s underlying policy 
goal—avoid litigating property claims between unmarried cohabitants—is 
not being served. Claims between unmarried cohabitants continue to mani-
fest themselves in the only way conceivable—one partner asserts an equi-
table claim for which the consideration is something other than the 
relationship itself and seeks relief that does not look too much like marital 
rights.108 And not only do these claims manifest themselves, but the merito-
rious ones actually win.109 Thus, there seems to be some situations where 
the courts deem the cohabitant worthy of receiving property rights, but 
without a clear indication of what relationships are worthy of recognition, 
litigation may continue to increase as cohabitation increases.
If the Illinois Supreme Court is going to continue to refuse to judicial-
ly determine the rights and obligations of unmarried cohabitants concerning 
property and financial rights, then the legislature must take action. By giv-
ing courts and litigants something to rely on, the legislature can limit the 
quantity and type of claims brought by cohabitants—thus accomplishing 
the aim of the supreme court—while also ensuring that those relationships 
that are most worthy of recognition are protected.
II. WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS?
Although no state has a statutory scheme specifically addressing the 
rights and obligations of unmarried cohabitants, forty-seven states enforce 
some form of relief based on a cohabitating relationship.110 The contractual 
rights granted to unmarried cohabitants ranges from virtually none—as is 
the case in Illinois, Georgia and Louisiana where courts refuse to enforce 
any agreement regarding property and support between unmarried cohabit-
ants unless it is entirely collateral to the intimate relationship111—to rights
very similar to those given to married couples. Washington State, for ex-
ample, essentially treats cohabitating couples the same as married couples 
108. See supra Part I.B.
109. See supra Part I.B.1.
110. Illinois, Georgia, and Louisiana are the only three states that have disapproved of enforcing 
all forms of relief based on a cohabiting relationship. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 
1979); Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 
So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
111. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211; Long, 441 S.E.2d at 476; Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 325.
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upon termination of the relationship.112 The majority of states will enforce 
express or implied contracts between cohabitants, and grant equitable re-
lief.
Thus, the Illinois legislature has a variety of options available to it in 
deciding what type of agreements between unmarried cohabitants will be 
recognized. This section will examine how other jurisdictions have chosen 
to handle allocating property rights after unmarried cohabitants end their 
relationships and the benefits and detriments associated with each ap-
proach.
A. Marvin v. Marvin: Express Agreements, Implied Agreements, and 
Equitable Relief Recognized
As previously discussed, the first court to directly speak on the law’s 
role in regulating cohabitational relationships was the California Supreme 
Court in Marvin v. Marvin.113 There, actor Lee Marvin was romantically 
involved with Michele Triola, and they lived together for over five years 
until they eventually split.114 Triola sued Marvin for support and one-half 
of the property acquired during the course of their relationship based on an 
oral agreement they had to “combine their efforts and earnings and [] share 
equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether 
individual or combined.”115
The court’s decision came during a time when cohabitation had 
moved from the fringes to the center of society.116 As such, the Marvin
majority relied on the newfound social acceptability of cohabitation and 
urged that “the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society 
and the social acceptance of them” required courts to decline applying tra-
ditional legal standards that were “based on alleged moral considerations 
that [had] apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.”117 In doing 
so, the Marvin court not only approved the enforcement of explicit rela-
tional contracts between cohabitants, but also authorized trial courts to 
112. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (adopting the rule that courts 
must examine the meretricious relationship and the property accumulations and make a just and equita-
ble disposition of the property).
113. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
114. Id. at 110.
115. Id.
116. Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42 
FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008).
117. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122 (“[W]e believe that the prevalence of non-marital relationships in 
modern society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no 
means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious relationship . . . .”).
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“inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct 
demonstrate[d] an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or 
joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.”118
The court also approved of equitable remedies—quantum meruit, construc-
tive trust, resulting trust—which had served as relief to cohabitants prior to 
its decision, and left open the possibility of “additional equitable remedies 
to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in 
cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate.”119 Thus, California 
became the first state to judicially recognize and “dramatically expand the 
range of rights and remedies available to cohabiting couples.”120
After California’s holding in Marvin, many other states followed suit 
and held that cohabitants could assert property rights under express con-
tract, implied contract or equity.121 Despite it being the dominant approach 
to cohabitation claims in the United States, this approach to regulating 
rights between cohabitants has two substantial pitfalls.
First, it may be very difficult to prove an implied agreement or assert 
equitable rights, as exemplified by the aftermath of the California Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Marvin. Michele Triola spent three months on remand 
attempting to assert her property rights under any of the three options the 
Supreme Court expressly approved of. However, the trial court found that 
“no express contract was negotiated between the parties” and that “the 
conduct of the parties . . . does not reveal any implementation of any con-
tract nor . . . give rise to an implied contract.”122 The court went on to con-
clude that there was no “mutual effort” that might support a recovery and 
118. Id.
119. Id. at 123 n.25.
120. Garrison, supra note 116, at 315.
121. States that recognize express and implied contracts as well as equitable rights include: Arizo-
na, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Katherine C. 
Gordon, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: When Strings Attach and How to 
Prevent Them—A State Survey, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 245, 249 (1999) (“[C]ourts in these states have 
demonstrated a willingness to use various theories to grant relief to the aggrieved party upon termina-
tion of a period of unmarried cohabitation.”) See also, e.g., Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 (Ariz. 
1986); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142 (Conn. 
1987); Poe v. Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Maria v. Freitas, 832 P.2d 259 (Haw. 
1992); Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Kerkove v. Thompson, 487 N.W.2d 693 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Ellis v. Berry, 867 P.2d 1063 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 
S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Crowe v. DeGioia, 495 A.2d 
889 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Knauer v. 
Knauer, 470 A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Harmon v. Rogers, 510 A.2d 161 (Vt. 1986); Connel v. 
Francisco, 898 P.2d 831(Wash. 1995); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 
405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987).
122. HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 235 (6th ed. 
2007) (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
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that, “in good conscience,” no equitable remedies were applicable.123 In the 
court’s view, Lee Marvin never had any obligation to support Michelle and 
therefore had not been unjustly enriched, and that Michelle had in fact ben-
efited from the parties’ cohabitation.124 Despite these findings, the court 
nonetheless awarded the plaintiff $104,000 in alimony,
so that she may have the economic means to reeducate herself and to 
learn new, employable skills or to refurbish those utilized, for example, 
during her most recent employment and so that she may return from her
status as companion of a motion picture star to a separate, independent 
but perhaps more prosaic existence.125
However, this award was promptly stuck down on appeal as it had not been 
sanctioned by the contract approach outlined in Marvin.126 Thus, Michele 
Triola walked away from her landmark victory in the California Supreme 
Court with nothing.
Second, this approach gives the cohabitant seeking to assert contractu-
al rights more leverage over the partner with the property. The non-
property-owning-partner can easily allege an implied contract in Marvin
jurisdictions. The threat of a lengthy court battle then gives this partner 
greater leverage in any agreement to equitably divide property when a co-
habitating relationship ends. This also gives the property-owning partner a 
greater incentive to reach an agreement with their ex-cohabitants outside of 
court given the multiple judicial tools available to cohabitants to establish 
property rights. Thus, even cohabitants who had no intention of creating 
property/finance-sharing rights might be able to put themselves in a posi-
tion to obtain such rights by threatening a lawsuit.
B. Beal v. Beal: Express or Implied Agreements Recognized
Another approach, taken by Oregon, is to only enforce express and 
implied agreements between unmarried cohabitants.127 As stated by the 
123. Id.
124. Cordelia S. Munroe, Comment, Marvin v. Marvin: Five Years Later, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 389, 
420 (1982).
125. Krause, supra note 122; see also Garrison, supra note 116.
126. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
127. Alaska takes a similar approach. See Wood v. Collins, 812 P.2d 951, 955–57 (Alaska 1991) 
(implementing the rule that property accumulated during cohabitation should be divided by determining 
the express or implied intent of the parties and refusing to extend equitable remedies to unmarried 
cohabitants). Maryland, Nebraska and Wyoming will also enforce express and implied agreements 
between unmarried cohabitants, but unlike Oregon and Alaska, have not expressly denied equitable 
remedies to such couples. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Flisher, 572 A.2d 501, 509 (Md. 1990); 
Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Neb. 1981); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 
1981).
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Oregon Supreme Court in Beal v. Beal, when dividing property accumulat-
ed during a non-marital cohabitating relationship, Oregon takes the ap-
proach of first inquiring into the intent of the parties.128 Where intent can 
be found, such as in an express written agreement, it should control the 
property division; and, even where a written agreement does not exist, 
“courts should closely examine the facts in evidence to determine what the 
parties implicitly agreed upon.”129
Unlike the California Supreme Court in Marvin, the Oregon Supreme 
Court illustrated various guidelines courts could use to determine the im-
plied intent of the cohabitants:
[I]nferences can be drawn from factual settings in which the parties 
lived. Cohabitation itself can be relevant evidence of an agreement to 
share incomes during continued cohabitation. Additionally, joint acts of 
a financial nature can give rise to an inference that the parties intended to 
share equally. Such acts might include a joint checking account, a joint 
savings account, or joint purchases.130
The couple in Beal, one month after obtaining a divorce, purchased a house 
where the defendant, Barbara Beal, contributed the majority of the down 
payment and made the first monthly payment, and the plaintiff, Raymond 
Beal made all subsequent monthly payments.131 The parties lived together 
in the house and had a joint savings account, but maintained separate 
checking accounts. Barbara paid some of the costs for home improvements, 
and her income was used for family expenses.132
Applying the aforementioned guidelines, the Oregon Supreme Court 
held that the record supported the position that the parties intended to pool 
their resources for their common benefit during the time they lived togeth-
er.133 This conclusion, the court said, was evidenced by the living arrange-
ment itself, as well as Barbara’s testimony that she contributed her entire 
income to the maintenance of the household and that she gave plaintiff 
money on one occasion for the monthly house payment. Further, “[n]either 
party made any effort to keep separate accounts or to total their respective 
contributions for reimbursement purposes, and, although they had separate 
checking accounts, they had a joint savings account.”134 Thus, the court 
concluded the parties would be considered equal co-tenants, except that 
128. 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978) (en banc).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 507–08.
132. Id. at 508.
133. Id. at 510.
134. Id.
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Barbara would be entitled to an offset representing the amount she paid 
over and above one-half of the down payment.135
In adopting this intent-based rule, the Beal court attempted to cure 
problems with the previous “unannounced but inherent” judicial approach 
to assessing property rights of unmarried cohabitants.136 The old, hands-off 
approach—which was simply that the party with title, or, in some instanc-
es, possession, would receive ownership rights in the property concerned—
”often operate[d] to the great advantage of the cunning and the shrewd.”137
Furthermore the courts, in claiming that they would have no involvement in 
such matters, actually established “‘an effective and binding rule of law 
which tend[ed] to operate purely by accident or perhaps by reason of the 
cunning, anticipatory designs of just one of the parties.’”138 The Beal court 
also rejected the “mechanistic application” of co-tenancy rules since they 
did not “consider the nature of the relationship of the parties,” and would 
“not often accurately reflect the expectations of the parties.”139
Thus, Beal’s intent-based approach has the benefit of ensuring that 
whichever party has title does not obtain imbalanced leverage over the 
other. It also gives cohabiting couples the assurance that their intended 
agreements, whether expressed in a written agreement or implied in their 
actions, will be enforceable by the court. However, similar to Marvin juris-
dictions, this approach may grant one partner inappropriate leverage upon 
the parties’ separation if he or she can point to any facts which indicate the 
couple entered an implied agreement to share property. Unlike Marvin
jurisdictions, the intent-based approach gives courts more specific guide-
lines regarding what facts they can consider when finding such an intent. 
For that reason, the leverage of the parties remains more balanced in an 
intent-based jurisdiction since the court is limited to either enforcing ex-
press agreements, or enforcing implied agreements but only when certain 
facts can be shown regarding the couple’s living and financial arrange-
ments during their relationship.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 509.
137. Id. (quoting West v. Knowles, 311 P.2d 689, 693 (Wash. 1957) (Finley, J., concurring spe-
cially)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 510.
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C. Wilcox v. Trautz: Only Express Agreements Recognized
A final approach taken by states is to enforce only express written 
agreements between unmarried cohabitants. Courts in Kentucky140, Massa-
chusetts141, Michigan142, Minnesota143, Mississippi144, New Hampshire145,
New Mexico146, New York147, North Dakota148, Ohio149 and Texas150 will
enforce express agreements concerning property and financial rights be-
140. Kentucky courts, along with those in New Mexico and New York, have refused to recognize 
implied agreements between unmarried cohabitants as contrary to the abolition of common law mar-
riage, but have not expressly refused recognizing equitable rights. See Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 
149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Merrill v. Davis, 673 P.2d 1285 (N.M. 1983); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 
1154 (N.Y. 1980).
141. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 144 (Mass. 1998) (stating that unmarried cohabitants may 
lawfully contract concerning property, financial and other matters relevant to their relationship, and, 
such a contract is subject to rules of contract law and is valid even if expressly made in contemplation 
of a common living arrangement, except to the extent that sexual services constitute the only—or 
dominant—consideration for the agreement, or that enforcement should be denied on some other public 
policy ground).
142. The Michigan Court of Appeals has recognized that contracts entered into during the course 
of a “meretricious relationship” may be enforceable where there is “an express agreement to accumulate 
or transfer property following a relationship of some permanence and an additional consideration in the 
form of either money or of services.” Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); 
see also Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (“While the judicial branch is 
not without power to fashion remedies in this area, we are unwilling to extend equitable principles to 
the extent plaintiff would have us do so, since recovery based on principles of contracts implied in law 
essentially would resurrect the old common-law marriage doctrine which was specifically abolished by 
the Legislature.” (citations omitted)).
143. MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2008) provides that a contract which deals with the property and 
financial relationship of an unmarried, cohabiting man and woman will be enforced only if it is written 
and if the parties seek to enforce it after the relationship ends. MINN. STAT. § 513.076 provides that a 
trial court cannot hear claims by parties where there is no written contract if the consideration for the 
oral contract was the intimate relationship of the couple.
144. Mississippi does not authorize ordering division of property between cohabitants when the 
claim is “based upon a relationship.” Cates v. Swain, 215 So.3d 492, 495 (Miss. 2013). However, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court recently held that a cohabitant could recover the amounts she contributed 
toward the purchase and improvement of a joint residence based on a theory of unjust enrichment since 
the claim for recovery was based upon something other than the relationship itself. Id.
145. Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1982) (refusing to recognize implied contracts, 
or grant remedies under the theory of quantum meruit, between unmarried cohabitants without guidance 
from the legislature).
146. See supra note 140.
147. See supra note 140.
148. Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (holding that cohabitants generally may 
bring an action for partition of property if their intention was clear to own property jointly, but mere 
cohabitation is not enough to support the right to partition in the absence of actual joint ownership).
149. Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ohio 1994) (refusing to allow property division between 
unmarried cohabitants because of the lack of precedent).
150. Section 26.01(b)(3) of Texas’s statute of frauds requires that promises made on consideration 
of nonmarital conjugal cohabitation be in writing to be enforceable. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
26.01(b)(3) (West 2017). See also Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. App. 1997) (barring 
claims arising from a purported oral or implied partnership agreement as violative of the statute of 
frauds).
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tween unmarried cohabitants so long as the consideration is not based pri-
marily on sexual services.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts nicely laid out this ap-
proach in Wilcox v. Trautz.151 There, the court expressly recognized, for the 
first time, “that unmarried cohabitants may lawfully contract concerning 
property, financial, and other matters relevant to their relationship,” and 
such contracts are “subject to the rules of contract law and [are] valid even 
if expressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, ex-
cept to the extent that sexual services constitute the only, or dominant, con-
sideration for the agreement, or that enforcement should be denied on some 
other public policy ground.”152 In that case, a woman who had cohabited 
with a man as an unmarried couple for approximately twenty-five years153
brought an action seeking declaration that the written property agreement 
they had entered was invalid and unenforceable.154 “The agreement basical-
ly establishe[d] that, whether acquired before or during the relationship, 
‘what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is yours.’”155
In holding that the agreement should be enforced, the court recognized 
the dramatic changes in social mores regarding cohabitation between un-
married parties; such living arrangements were becoming relatively com-
mon and accepted.156 Because “a considerable number of persons live 
together without benefit of the rules of law that govern property, financial, 
and other matters in a marital relationship,” the court reasoned that it would 
“do well to recognize the benefits to be gained by encouraging unmarried 
cohabitants to enter into written agreements, as the consequences for each 
151. 693 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1998).
152. Id. at 146. Cases to the contrary in Massachusetts were expressly overruled. Id.
153. The parties lived together in a house purchased by defendant, with title in his name only.
Between 1973 and 1992, the plaintiff contributed $25 a week toward general household expenses, and 
throughout the course of the relationship, the plaintiff performed various household duties. She also 
contributed some of her income toward the maintenance and improvement of the parties’ home. Id. at
143.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 144 n.1. The court continued:
Specifically the agreement provide[d] that each party’s earnings and property is his or hers 
alone, and the other party shall have no interest in the property of the other; any services ren-
dered by either party are voluntary and without expectation of compensation; the parties shall 
maintain separate accounts; any debts or obligations are the responsibility of the party who 
acquired them; if one party contributes to the mortgage payment of a premises owned by the 
other party, the contribution is to be deemed rent only and shall not create in the contributor 
any interest in the property; and any money transferred from one party to the other, with the 
exception of mortgage or rent payments, shall be deemed a loan.
Id.
156. Id. at 144.
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partner may be considerable on termination of the relationship or, in partic-
ular, the death of one of the partners.”157
The court concluded that it would “ma[ke] no sense” to uphold certain 
financial and property arrangements between unmarried cohabitants—such 
as agreements to hold real property jointly or in common, agreements to 
create joint bank and other accounts, agreements to create joint invest-
ments, and testamentary disposition—that stem from a relationship involv-
ing sexual cohabitation, but “withhold enforcement of written agreements 
between the same parties when they attempt to settle the financial and other 
consequences if they should separate.”158 In either case, the parties are 
motivated by “an intention to hold, or dispose of, property in a mutually 
acceptable way in order to manage day-to-day matters and to avoid litiga-
tion when the relationship ends.”159
Thus, the court held that the instant property division agreement was 
valid and enforceable, as both parties had capacity to contract and under-
stood each other’s financial worth prior to execution of the agreement.160
However, the court also stressed that its decision left intact prior decisions 
affording preference for marriage, and should not “be taken as a suggestion 
or intimation that [the court is] retreating from [its] prior expressions re-
garding the importance of the institution of marriage and the strong public 
interest in ensuring that its integrity is not threatened.”161
This approach grants unmarried cohabitants a great deal of certainty 
concerning their financial and property rights. Cohabiting couples can rest 
assured that as long as their contract abides by the rules of contract law—
i.e. there was not fraud, overreaching, unconscionability, etc.—the court 
will enforce it unless the primary consideration is sexual services. Cohabit-
ants can easily avoid drafting an agreement based solely on sexual services 
or fidelity by excluding those topics and, more generally, the mention of 
domestic services, and instead framing the consideration in terms of “the 
common welfare of both parties, combined with an effort to further their 
financial partnership.”162
The problem with this approach is that, if the couple draft an unfair 
agreement, it will likely be enforced (unless it is found unconscionable) 
since courts will examine cohabitation agreements not under a “fair and 
157. Id. at 145.
158. Id. at 146.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 147–48.
161. Id. at 146.
162. Andrea D. Heinbach & Pierce J. Reed, Wilcox v. Trautz: The Recognition of Relationship 
Contracts in Massachusetts, 43 BOS. B.J. 6, 20 (1999).
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reasonable” standard, but rather, under a pure contract paradigm.163 Anoth-
er obvious problem with this approach is that many couples will fail to 
enter into such a contract, either because they are not aware of cohabitation 
agreements, or because they feel such an agreement is unnecessary. In 
these jurisdictions, such couples will be left with little legal recourse since 
the court in Wilcox explicitly rejected those portions of Marvin and other 
cases which grant property rights to a nonmarital partner in the absence of 
an express contract.164
D. The Legislature Should Enact a Statute Making Express Agree-
ments and Certain Implied Agreements Between Unmarried Cohabitants 
Enforceable
As evidenced by these jurisdictions’ various approaches, the Illinois 
legislature will have many options available to it in deciding which rela-
tionships—and which rights associated with them—will be recognized. 
However, given the Illinois Supreme Court’s desire that the courts avoid 
litigation of disputes between unmarried cohabitants, along with the need to 
provide unmarried cohabitants with greater certainty and fairness, the best 
option is to enforce express agreements (where the consideration is not 
primarily sex) and implied agreements, but only where the party seeking 
relief meets specific statutory requirements.
III. AN ILLINOIS COHABITATION STATUTE
As discussed in Part I above, there is a problem in Illinois right now 
when it comes to cohabitation agreements. A forty-year old precedent is 
being followed, but its underlying goal of keeping property claims brought 
by unmarried cohabitants out of court is not being accomplished. Moreo-
ver, the public policy on which it relies—favoring marriage over private 
arrangements—is being served by withholding basic common-law rights 
from nonmarital couples, despite the unfair consequences that result from 
that approach. Unfortunately, given the chance to reconsider and modernize 
a decades-old approach, the Illinois Supreme Court has remained dedicated 
to the position that this “delicate area of marriage-like relationships, which 
163. Id. at 19.
164. Wilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 145 n.3. However, more recently, the Massachusetts Appellate Court, 
after acknowledging that other states have permitted equitable claims that are not predicated on sexual 
relations or the cohabiting relationship itself, has allowed unmarried cohabitants to bring claims based 
on a recognized equitable remedy. See Sutton v. Valois, 846 N.E.2d 1171, 1175–76 (Mass. 2006) 
(citing Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1267–69 (Colo. 2000); Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241, 
245 (Ill. 1983)).
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involves evaluation of sociological data and alternatives . . . [is] best suited 
to the superior investigative and fact-finding facilities of the legislative 
branch in the exercise of its traditional authority to declare public policy in 
the domestic relations field.”165 Thus, in the absence of judicial action, the 
legislature must answer the call of the Illinois Supreme Court and update 
Illinois public policy to reflect our changing society, and, at the very least, 
grant unmarried cohabitants the same rights as those not in a cohabitating, 
sexual relationship.
Given the options available for enforcement of cohabitation agree-
ments, and considering the underlying goal of the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Hewitt, the best approach for Illinois is to enforce express, and certain im-
plied, cohabitation agreements between unmarried cohabitants, but refuse 
to hear equitable claims.
A. Enforce Express Agreements
First, the legislature should enact a statute codifying what courts in ju-
risdictions that recognize only express agreements166 have held, i.e., a writ-
ten contract concerning property and financial matters between unmarried 
cohabitants, even if made in contemplation of cohabitation, is enforceable 
except to the extent that sexual services constitute the dominant considera-
tion for the agreement.167 The legislature should indicate that the contract is 
only enforceable upon termination of the relationship,168 and will become 
invalid if the parties eventually marry.169 Finally, the statute should indicate 
that such contract will not be enforced to the extent that it fails to conform 
with Illinois law or public policy.
Enabling unmarried cohabitants to contract with each other will give 
them greater certainty with respect to their property and financial rights. 
Furthermore, it would put an end to the unfortunate situation in Illinois in 
which unmarried cohabitants have lesser rights to contract than single indi-
viduals. Allowing cohabitants to enter into contract will also reduce litiga-
tion, since parties are less likely to seek judicial intervention when they 
have established contractual rights to rely on.
165. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 58, 69 N.E.3d 834, 851 (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 
394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 1979)). However, as indicated in Part II, the economic rights of cohabitants 
in nearly all states, with Minnesota and Texas being the only exceptions, have come about through 
judicial opinions rather than legislative enactments.
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998).
168. MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2008).
169. Wilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 146 n.4.
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B. Allow Certain Implied Contract Claims
Since not every cohabitating couple will have the means or the fore-
sight to enter into a cohabitation agreement, the Illinois legislature should 
also create statutory guidelines that indicate what relationships are worthy 
of recognition in the absence of a written agreement. As evidenced by the 
newly-enacted maintenance statute170, the Illinois legislature is capable of 
setting threshold requirements and detailing what exactly courts should 
consider when litigating an issue.171 Thus, in writing a statute that sets a 
requirement for cohabitating couples seeking to enforce property and fi-
nancial rights, the legislature can set a threshold requirement that will en-
sure that only meritorious claims are heard.
For example, the legislature might require that the cohabitating rela-
tionship last at least five years before a party can assert rights arising from 
an implied agreement. Or, the legislature could follow Oregon’s intent-
based approach, and require that the courts consider evidence which tends 
to show the parties’ implied intent to enter a cohabitation agreement, in-
cluding shared incomes and joint financial acts—such as joint checking 
accounts, savings accounts or purchases. The legislature might also simply
state that litigants need only prove an indication that the couple was sub-
stantially committed to each other and leave it to the courts to determine, 
based on the facts of the case, whether or not relief is appropriate. Howev-
er, the clearer the guidelines the legislature provides, the less litigation will 
result.
Whatever requirements the legislature deems appropriate, having an 
option for unmarried cohabitants to assert rights based on implied contract 
will ensure that meritorious claims are not turned away simply because the 
couple did not enter a written agreement. Furthermore, such a statute would 
serve as an incentive for litigants to settle out of court, knowing that they 
either can or cannot establish the necessary elements to bring an implied 
contract claim.
C. Refuse Equitable Claims
The legislature should also announce a policy stating that unmarried 
cohabitants are not permitted to bring claims based on equitable rights. It 
has long been recognized that equitable adjudication is a potentially dan-
170. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2017).
171. Under Illinois’s maintenance statute, the court must first consider fourteen relevant factors 
and decide whether or not a maintenance award is appropriate. Id. 5/504(a)–(b).
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gerous source of arbitrary discretion by courts.172 As has been shown in 
cases following Hewitt, the standards the courts apply in deciding equitable 
claims related to cohabitating relationships vary substantially depending on 
what is asserted in a complaint or what relief is sought. Additionally, such 
claims often require the court to delve into the couple’s relationship and it 
is often difficult for litigants to prove equitable rights arising independently 
from the cohabitating relationship, which can drain judicial time and re-
sources. Recognizing equitable rights of cohabitants undermines the under-
lying policy goal of the Illinois Supreme Court, expressed in Hewitt: to 
avoid substantial litigation that involves details of a couple’s living ar-
rangement.
As such, the legislature should make a clear indication that any claim 
brought by unmarried cohabitants seeking property or financial rights must 
either be in writing, or conform to the statutory requirements allowing im-
plied claims.
CONCLUSION
This suggested approach will give courts and litigants something con-
crete to rely on when planning and evaluating cohabitation agreements. 
Furthermore, it will ensure that compelling claims—which, as shown in 
Part I.B above, manifest themselves either way—are not only allowed, but 
are grounded in law. Such a statute will save litigants, lawyers, and courts 
time and resources because only meritorious claims will be heard, and 
courts will be able to avoid hearing equitable claims related to marriage-
type rights. Finally, this approach will allow the legislature to determine 
what types of relationship we want to recognize in order to ensure merito-
rious claims are treated fairly, while keeping in line with Illinois public 
policy favoring marriage.
172. GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE 
RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1982) (“Throughout the entire history of procedural innovations in 
equitable adjudication it was understood that equity is a potentially dangerous source of arbitrary dis-
cretion.”).
